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The possibility of nuclear destruction in the modern world has created a secular eschatology which, unlike
religious eschatologies, creates nihilism and apathy rather than ultimate meaning. The Japanese film Dreams,
by Akira Kurosawa, depicts this secularized eschatology as well as a counter-apocalyptic utopia. However,
Kurosawa does not merely repeat the Western visions of nuclear apocalypse, but uses Japanese folk religion as
a lens through which this apocalypse can be viewed. By doing so, Kurosawa creates a specifically Eastern
response to nuclear destruction: a “religious secular” eschatology. Despite its lack of critical success, Dreams
provides a valuable alternative for Western theologians in a nuclear age.
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 With the invention of nuclear weapons, human society has pushed its power of 
destruction to an apocalyptic level. The end of the world, which used to serve only as a localized 
or mythological trope, can now be discussed as a real, even inevitable, fate for the planet as a 
whole. The possibility of apocalypse from a purely materialist, realist, or scientific standpoint 
poses a challenge to religious eschatologies, which, especially in the West, grant God absolute 
power over the future. If humans have the ability to wipe out life itself, eschatology can be 
framed in a secular way – i.e., without recourse to any divinely ordained destruction. Of course, 
nuclear war may also have a place in religious eschatologies, which often envision it as one step 
in the process towards God’s ultimate victory over the forces of evil.1 However, the prospect of 
nuclear war uniquely lends itself to a vision of a purely human-caused apocalypse. 
 In the West, then, apocalyptic themes can generally be placed in two categories: the 
religious and the secular. As Conrad Ostwalt says in his analysis of the apocalyptic in film, 
“Secular apocalypses generally differ from traditional ones in the exclusion of the supernatural 
as a means of agency for the end of time…What normally occurs in these disaster films is that 
humankind replaces God in the apocalyptic drama in that humanity becomes responsible either 
for the destruction of the earth or the salvation of it or both.”2 While religious eschatologies 
imagine an ultimate purpose behind global destruction, the secularization of eschatology 
generally manifests itself in absurdism. As Daniel Wojcik says, “Ideas about the unalterable 
destruction of the world, when lacking the mythic component of worldly renewal and the belief 
in divine control, ultimately may be expressed as a form of nihilistic fatalism.”3 The 
secularization of apocalypse therefore results in widespread feelings of apathy and futility.4 
 As many scholars have pointed out, however, the dichotomy between secular and sacred 
is a product of Western civilization and is not universally applicable. For most of human history, 
religious and secular spheres have historically been intertwined, making impossible any sharp 
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distinction between the two. According to William Cavanaugh, the dichotomy between religion 
and secularity was a function of the rise of the modern nation-state in 15th to 17th-century 
Western Europe. The invention of religion was bound up with changing configurations of power 
and contributed to the new dominance of colonial powers. “Specifically, the concept of religion 
justifies the liberal state’s self-presentation as an apparatus concerned with the wholly negative 
function of preventing the incursion of substantive, collective ends into the public sphere.”5 We 
should expect, therefore, that Ostwalt’s distinction between traditional and secular apocalypse 
might not translate well to non-Western film. 
 Furthermore, eschatology itself is foreign to many religious worldviews. As Norman 
Cohn says, the idea of a final consummation of time only appeared with Zoroastrianism around 
the 6th century BCE.6 From there, the idea was adopted into Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 
However, most Eastern worldviews maintain a cyclical view of time in which there is no hope 
for a final end of the world itself. In particular, Shintoism has traditionally done without any 
form of eschatology whatsoever. As Stuart Picken says, “[S]ince Shinto is concerned with 
development and stages of growth, it really views death as simply a stage in a longer process. 
Certainly there is no kind of Shinto eschatology, and little about life after death in the Western 
sense in which this is conceived. Later concepts, such as the idea of the Pure Land, belong 
entirely to Buddhism.”7  
 Despite the foreignness of apocalypse, especially secular apocalypse, to the Eastern 
worldview, the recent “secularization” of apocalyptic possibility has been foisted onto Japanese 
society. As the only country as yet to sustain a nuclear attack, Japan has had to wrestle even 
more than others with the implications of nuclear destruction. 8 Akira Kurosawa, Japan’s best-
known film director, produced several films that explored the psychological effect of the nuclear 
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These films are not necessarily apocalyptic, since they deal 
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only with the historical, localized destruction of American atomic bombs in World War II. 
However, towards the end of his life, Kurosawa directed a film called Dreams,9 which explores 
explicitly apocalyptic and counter-apocalyptic futures. Given his Japanese context, Kurosawa’s 
treatment of eschatology provides an interesting specimen of eschatology framed in an Eastern 
context. I argue here that apocalypse in Kurosawa’s Dreams cannot be neatly categorized within 
the usual Western framework. 
 The difference lies in Kurosawa’s juxtaposition of secular and religious apocalyptic 
themes. While on the surface, his visions appear to exist in a materialist or realist paradigm, 
Kurosawa’s depiction of eschatological possibilities must in fact be understood through a 
religious or mythological lens, specifically that of Japanese folk religion. While modern 
technology has moved eschatology from the mythological to the secular, Kurosawa’s film takes 
us in the opposite direction, remythologizing the secular. In doing so, Kurosawa’s counter-
apocalyptic vision provides an alternative to either the hopelessness of materialistic apocalypse 
or the yearning for supernatural intervention that characterizes religious apocalypse. Rather than 
mimicking either of these two Western forms of eschatology, Dreams is a uniquely Eastern 
apocalyptic film that blurs the distinction between the religious and the secular. 
 Dreams is one of Kurosawa’s lesser known films, receiving only lukewarm critical 
review. Compared to his other films, Dreams is accused of being simplistic, didactic and self-
conscious.10 Certainly Record of a Living Being (1955) or Rhapsody in August (1991) provide 
more nuanced and interesting explorations of post-nuclear Japanese society. However, the 
apocalyptic elements of Dreams do provide a unique window into Kurosawa’s vision for society, 
a prescriptive rather than descriptive take on post-nuclear Japan. The very characteristics that 
make the film almost unworthy of Kurosawa also make it interesting in terms of eschatology. 
Despite its didactic tone, Dreams, out of all of Kurosawa’s films, makes most obvious the 
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contemporary yearning for a counter-apocalyptic future in the face of nuclear apocalypse. 
Moreover, Kurosawa succeeds in expressing this desire in a way that defies Western tendencies 
to separate “religion” from the public sphere. 
 The film is made up of eight short segments, each ostensibly based on an actual dream of 
the director. Of these eight segments, the last three pertain to the future of society. The first of 
these, “Mt. Fuji in Red,” begins with the explosion of nuclear reactors at the base of Mt. Fuji. 
There is chaos in the streets, and a short dialogue between “I” (the character representing 
Kurosawa), a businessman and a mother with a child. The film cuts to a scene on the coast, 
where most of the Japanese crowd has already leapt into the sea. Presumably all these people 
have drowned, but even if they were to survive the leap, the businessman explains, there would 
be no chance of survival. The nuclear fallout will expand too far even for dolphins to escape its 
effects. As the four of them stand on the edge of the cliff, clouds of nuclear material waft over 
them, bringing with it slow and certain death. The woman expresses a deep sense of betrayal 
(“They told us it was safe!”) and the businessman acknowledges his guilt and responsibility for 
the existence of the reactors. Aware of the absurdity of his action, the businessman too jumps off 
the cliff. The segment ends with “I” and the woman hopelessly exposed to the radiation around 
them. 
 The next segment, “The Demon,” is set in a post-apocalyptic Japan. “I” is walking over 
barren mountains of ash and comes across a man horribly disfigured by the fallout of nuclear 
missiles. The “demon” explains the irreversible damage done to this world. Humans have all 
grown strange horns on their heads that cause them excruciating pain. Even the few plants that 
grow here are crazy – there are giant dandelions and roses that have stems growing out of their 
petals. In such a world, the demons can only survive through cannibalism. Death itself is seen as 
a release from the unending misery of existence. Looking over the mountain, the demon shows 
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“I” a scene of Dantesque horror. Groups of demons writhe in pain around blood-red pools of 
toxic waste. Finally, the demon turns to threaten “I,” who runs and stumbles down the mountain 
of ash. 
 The last segment of the film, “Village of the Watermills,” counters these apocalyptic 
images with an idyllic village scene filmed on a wasabi farm in Nagano. “I” wanders up to the 
village and sees a group of children sprinkling flowers on a rock by a river. He notices an old 
man repairing a waterwheel, and asks him why the children did this. He explains that a stranger 
was once found dead on that spot many generations ago. The villagers took pity and buried him 
there, and it is now a tradition to put flowers on the gravestone whenever anyone passes the spot.  
The old man goes on to say that the village has abandoned all modern technology and lives in 
harmony with nature. They harvest rice in the traditional manner, use dead firewood and cow 
dung for fuel, and live to a ripe old age. (The old man himself is 103 years old.) After talking 
with “I,” the old man rises to join the funeral celebration of another villager. The inhabitants of 
the village do not mourn death when it comes naturally to those that have lived a full life. The 
film ends as the funeral procession passes. As “I” departs, he drops flowers over the grave of the 
stranger. 
 Despite the heavy-handed thematic nature of the film, Dreams contains more depth and 
ambiguity than some critics give it credit for, probably due to the Western critics’ unfamiliarity 
with the folk religion upon which many of the “dreams” are based. The link to Japanese folklore 
provides the film with added layers which counteract the moralistic dialogue in much of the film.  
 Of the eight episodes in Dreams, the first four are set in a specifically mythological 
mode. The first episode, “Sunshine Through the Rain,” features the mythological kitsune, or 
foxes. The kitsune are ambiguous spirits in Japanese folklore; they are seen as messengers for 
Inari, the rice diety, but they also function as the shape-shifting tricksters so common in 
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mythology.11 In Dreams, the kitsune exhibit this ambiguous relationship to humans. “I” (a young 
boy) disobeys his mother and comes across a wedding of the kitsune. Because humans are not 
allowed to see these ceremonies, the boy is asked to commit suicide. His mother gives him no 
pity. The rules of the kitsune are harsh, but clear, and it is his own fault if he is now doomed to 
die. The scene ends with the boy leaving home to ask the foxes for unlikely forgiveness. 
 The second episode, “The Peach Orchard,” explores the relationship between traditional 
Japanese dolls (hina-ningyo) and the spirits of peach trees. In Japanese folklore, such dolls are 
commonly thought to temporarily house spirits for the duration of the doll festival. If one 
appropriately welcomed these spirits into one’s home, they would secure blessings and 
prosperity for the next year.12 In this episode, however, the spirits are angered by the cutting 
down of the family’s peach orchard. The boy attempts to apologize to the spirits for this 
destruction, and eventually they understand that he also felt deeply the loss of the peach 
blossoms. In the form of a ceremonial dance, the spirits give the boy one last look at the orchard. 
 In “The Blizzard,” Kurosawa draws on the folk legend of Yuki-onna. Yuki-onna is a 
spirit that appears during snowstorms in order to lure travelers to their deaths.13 In the film, a 
group of mountaineers are caught in a blizzard and begin to lose energy. They begin to fall 
asleep one by one. As the last climber succumbs to exhaustion, he sees a woman through the 
snow who spreads a blanket over him and assures him that, “The snow is warm.” Ultimately, he 
resists the temptation to sleep and awakens the other climbers.  
 Film critic Terrence Rafferty’s review of this scene provides a good example of the 
misunderstanding that can occur when Western critics view the film without a knowledge of the 
underlying mythology. Of the Yuki-onna, he says, “We can’t take our eyes off her, and we’re 
never quite sure what she’s meant to represent. She is beautiful – impossibly, indefinably 
beautiful – and this is perhaps the most piercing image ever made of the desires that keep people 
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from surrendering to death: this is a spirit to leap out of your deathbed in pursuit of.”14 Rafferty 
sees the beauty of the scene but misses the sinister nature of that beauty. The Yuki-onna 
represents, of course, the very desire to surrender, a desire to keep to one’s death bed rather than 
leaping out of it. Without the benefit of a mythological background, Rafferty misses the richness 
(and horror) of this scene. 
  “The Tunnel” combines World War II imagery with the yurei of folk mythology. 
According to popular legend, a person’s reikon, or soul, travels through a sort of purgatory after 
death in order to join the ancestors. However, if a person dies with unfulfilled desires, their 
reikon, or soul, may transform into a ghostly yurei that haunts the physical world.15 Kurosawa 
depicts an officer who must face the yurei of a platoon of soldiers that were killed under his 
command. They report for duty as usual, not believing that they are dead, and the officer must 
convince them to leave this world for the afterlife. 
  The fifth episode, “Crows,” portrays Kurosawa as an artist daydreaming in front of a set 
of Van Gogh paintings in a gallery. He imagines himself in the landscapes of the paintings, and 
has a conversation with Van Gogh himself. Despite the magical feel of this scene, it is clear that 
the intended interpretation is that of a daydream rather than any mythological event. It is 
interesting to note that this first de-mythologized scene is also the scene that introduces most 
clearly Western influences into the film. 
 Except for the fifth episode, the only “dreams” that can be interpreted in a purely 
materialistic way are the scenes described earlier that deal with apocalyptic themes. “Mt. Fuji in 
Red” and “Village of the Watermills” both portray a heightened version of reality, the first 
nightmarish, the second idyllic. However, neither scene makes any explicit reference to Japanese 
folklore. “The Weeping Demon” does make explicit reference to mythology in its identification 
of the disfigured humans as oni (demons). In this scene, however, the folklore serves only as a 
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metaphor for a strictly materialistic, albeit fanciful, possibility, i.e. total nuclear war and 
devastation. In the same way that humans who suffer greatly are said to become oni in some 
Japanese folktales,16 nuclear fallout has caused such intense suffering that the survivors are better 
described as monsters. This story does not rest on the actual existence of mythological spirits, as 
does the first half of the film. 
 The contrast between the explicitly mythological first half of the film and the de-
mythologized second half provides a commentary on the way that Western technology and 
civilization has broken into an Eastern context in the modern era. Apocalypticism, virtually 
unknown in Eastern paradigms, has forced its way into the Japanese psyche with Hiroshima. But 
this apocalypticism is not even the prophetic, value-laden apocalypticism of Christianity. At least 
the Christian vision of the end-times overlays ultimate meaning onto its view of hopelessness for 
this world. The nuclear age has shown the East, and Japan in particular, an uncompromising 
materialistic apocalypse. The resulting nihilism appears to leave no room for ultimate value. 
 Yet Kurosawa does more than simply portray a nihilistic apocalypse. His nightmarish 
scenes present a strong opposition to the consumerism, technology and hubris that make nuclear 
destruction possible. Moreover, his setting of a materialistic apocalypse alongside mythological 
scenes leads the viewer to see materialism itself through a mythological lens. These factors, each 
of which we will examine in more detail, contribute to Kurosawa’s overall strategy. As a whole, 
Kurosawa aims to remythologize reality in order to finally arrive at the culmination of the film: 
the counter-apocalyptic vision of society in harmony with nature. 
 The juxtaposition of “Mt. Fuji in Red” and “The Weeping Demon” with “Village of the 
Watermills” highlights Kurosawa’s objection to consumerism. In the former scene, destruction 
occurs not through an act of violence, but through an accident made possible by society’s greed 
for electricity. The nuclear plant exists, not because of any intrinsic necessity, but to quench 
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consumer demand. Here the businessman represents the culpability of a consumer society, as 
opposed to the innocence of the children who are also doomed to die. In the face of the mother’s 
rage against their hopeless predicament, the businessman says merely, “I’m sorry. I am one of 
those who deserve to die.” This character is perhaps the calmest of the three survivors, but only 
because he has most absorbed the despair of the situation. He quickly jumps off the cliff to avoid 
a slow and painful death. “Waiting to die isn’t living,” he says. 
  So too in “The Weeping Demon,” the wasteful tendencies of capitalism are criticized. 
Nuclear fallout has wiped out any edible plants or animals from the earth, and the “demons” 
resort to cannibalism. The main demon tells “I” about his former life. “I was a farmer when I was 
a man…I dumped gallons of milk in the river to keep the prices up. I buried potatoes and 
cabbages with a bulldozer…How stupid!” In the context of complete destitution, it seems 
ludicrous to have privileged profit above the natural plenitude of the earth. 
 The connection between secular apocalypticism and consumerism is brought home in the 
dialogue between “I” and the old man in “Village of the Watermills.” “I” notices that the homes 
contain only oil lamps. “There’s no electricity here?” he asks. The old man responds, “Don’t 
need it. People get too used to convenience. They think convenience is better. They throw out 
what’s truly good.” After witnessing the complete destruction of nature two scenes before as a 
direct result of demand for electricity, this statement is especially striking. Kurosawa thus calls 
into question the structures that make nuclear apocalypse possible. He offers instead an 
alternative to consumerism in which “convenience” is scorned and beauty is preserved. 
Kurosawa insists on the incompatibility of capitalism and a counter-apocalyptic society (i.e., one 
that is sustainable and rhythmic rather than terminable). 
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 Technology also fares poorly in Kurosawa’s film. It is technology that allows both 
nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons, both of which provide no benefits to society that can 
possibly justify their destruction of nature. The clearest anti-technological statement can be 
found in “Village of the Watermills,” again in the words of the old man. “People today have 
forgotten they’re really a part of nature,” he says. “They always think they can make something 
better. Especially scientists…They only invent things that in the end make people unhappy.” For 
Kurosawa, technology is ultimately destructive in its inherent undermining of a sustainable 
relationship between humans and nature. 
 Technology is especially harmful when it is linked to excessive hubris. Not only do 
scientists create unnecessary and destructive inventions, but they also place excessive value on 
them. “[Scientists] are so proud of their innovations. What’s worse, most people are, too. They 
view them as if they were miracles. They worship them.” In the “Weeping Demon,” Kurosawa 
caricatures the hierarchy of society built on arbitrary distinctions. “Even here we have grades,” 
the demon says. “One-horn demons like myself always get eaten by those who have two or three 
horns. Before, they were powerful and pretentious. And now they still throw their weight around 
as demons.” Again, Kurosawa underscores the tendency of humans to place value wrongly or 
arbitrarily. That which truly has value is disdained, while destructiveness or brute power is 
honored.17 
 While Kurosawa’s opposition to consumerism, technology and hubris are important to his 
vision, his most creative move is to place these concerns within a context of mythology. The 
film, when viewed as a whole, builds from its mythological scenes and maintains a mythological 
tone even as its content shifts to a secular mode. One arrives at the apocalyptic scenes thoroughly 
immersed in a mythological worldview, and thus cannot help but view the secular through the 
lens of the mythological. Kurosawa encourages this in the viewer by blurring the lines that 
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separate the two modes of thought. In “The Weeping Demon,” of course, we are led to connect 
nuclear fallout with the oni-creating suffering of Japanese folklore. In “Mt. Fuji in Red,” the 
mountain, illuminated by nuclear explosion, immediately evokes in us a broader range of 
meaning. The mountain is not just a mountain, explainable solely by geological forces. Fuji is 
rather a paradigmatic symbol of natural beauty, an always-changing and always-unique window 
into transcendence.18 Of course, with this Fuji in mind, we experience the nuclear explosions as a 
sacrilegious mockery of nature itself. And in the final section, we understand that, behind the old 
man, the village, the waterwheels, and the story of the stranger, there is something like 
mythology at play. In fact, Kurosawa has created a secular return to an imagined age of folklore, 
in which humans and nature lived in closer connection to one another. 
 Kurosawa’s counter-apocalyptic vision is, perhaps, too simplistic to warrant much 
comment. After all, many authors and artists have proposed utopias with more depth to them. 
Many religious groups have even attempted to put into practice what Kurosawa describes so 
idyllically in his final film segment, with mixed results.19 Perhaps Kurosawa’s Dreams 
succumbs, in the end, to nostalgia rather than insight. Kurosawa wishes for a romanticized past 
in which humans are remembered (or, more likely, misremembered) as living in perfect harmony 
with nature. 
 In another sense, Kurosawa might be dismissed as simply repackaging a common 
Western pattern of apocalyptic films. As Conrad Ostwalt notes, there is an “End of Days” genre 
which is based on the primal fear of non-existence but actually functions to allay this fear. If the 
fear is related to divine judgment (as in Left Behind), the film points toward the hope of divine 
redemption. If the fear is ecological collapse (Waterworld) or an asteroid (Armageddon), the film 
shows humanity overcoming these obstacles.20 Whether religious or secular, apocalyptic films 
consistently explore themes of destruction and deliverance. Dreams is perhaps simply one more 
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effort to provide comfort in the face of an impending threat to human existence. It plays on the 
fear of nuclear disaster, but ends with an alternative hopeful future in which nature trumps 
technology. 
 Certainly Dreams does follow in a long line of Western apocalypticism, and Kurosawa 
finds source material both in Western culture and in the Western technology that had such 
disastrous effects on Japan during World War II and following. Yet there is something different 
about the way that Kurosawa overlays mythology onto materialism. In response to the apathy of 
secular apocalypticism, Kurosawa suggests that there is a deep value below the surface of things. 
We find something of this value when we re-experience the reverence and wonder that 
mythology evokes in us. Like the process theologian David Griffin, Kurosawa sees the need for a 
“reenchanted” world.21 However, Kurosawa retrieves enchantment not by denying 
supernaturalism, as Griffin does, nor by embracing it, as do more conservative religious groups, 
but by traveling through it to an enriched view of the world. He holds mythology lightly, using it 
as a lens without insisting on its content. The result is not a naturalistic theism, but a 
mythologized (or “religious”) secularism. 
 The history of religion in Japan may help to place this “religious secularism” in 
perspective. Japanese religion has always been a mixture of Shinto, the worship of gods 
representing natural forces, and Buddhism imported from Korea. These traditions made up a 
single ideological/cultural milieu until the 18th century. In Japan prior to this time, it would not 
have been possible to define either Shintoism or Buddhism as a distinct set of beliefs or practices 
in opposition to one another. When Japan was forcibly opened to Western trade, however, the 
Meiji government perceived the need for a distinctly Japanese ideology, and attempted to 
“purify” Shinto of its Buddhist elements. This purified Shinto became the official ideology of the 
state, and was used to foster unity and loyalty to the emperor.22 
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  In the 1870s, however, Japanese leaders came under pressure to follow the trends of 
Western society towards the separation of religion and state. In 1875, the government did declare 
freedom of religion for its subjects, but made a distinction between Shrine Shinto, a set of public 
rites dedicated to worshipping the state, and Sect Shinto, which included doctrinal beliefs. The 
latter was considered religion, the former, merely “rites” or civic duties.23 This placed the 
Japanese government in the awkward position of designating identical activities “religious” if 
they were performed privately, and “ritual” (public, non-religious) if they were performed by the 
government.24 
 By the end of World War II, Shrine Shinto had become so successful that the Allied 
Powers decided to remove it from public power. The rationale for doing so was the same that 
Japanese leaders had used for separating Shrine Shinto from popular Shinto: the separation of 
religion and state. “After years of denying the religiosity of Shinto, priests and apologists found 
themselves suddenly defined as religious, limited by the very principle of freedom of religious 
belief which they had once overcome by defining themselves against religion.”25 Today, ritual 
and doctrine still tend to be separated in Japanese society. Ritual is perceived as a component of 
social responsibility while individual “doctrines” are viewed with suspicion.26 “Indeed, ritual 
actions are increasing in modern Japanese society despite the fact that fewer and fewer Japanese 
actually believe in gods and their ability to bring benefits.”27 
 The history of religion in Japan has a significant effect on the way that religion and 
secularity are conceived in Japanese society. As Sarah Thal suggests, the idea of “Japaneseness” 
itself is a product of Shinto leaders blurring the boundaries between church and state, sacred and 
secular.28 If this is the case, we might see Kurosawa’s film as a uniquely Japanese response to 
the threat of nuclear annihilation. Although he draws on the originally Western idea of 
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apocalypse in order to address an existential fear, he portrays the threat of the end of the world 
and the possibility of redemption in a truly Japanese manner. 
 In summary, Kurosawa’s “religious secular” eschatology differs from the typical Western 
depictions of apocalypse, which fall into two major categories. Compared to the religious 
apocalyptic films in the West, Dreams does not rely on any type of divine omnipotence to 
guarantee a particular outcome. While he uses religious tropes in the film, they do not function as 
literal solutions to the existential fear of nuclear disaster. Rather, they serve as a lens through 
which that threat can be viewed. Just as Japanese society has grown skeptical about the ability of 
the gods to intervene in their lives, Kurosawa does not suggest that disaster will be initiated or 
averted supernaturally. The scenes that look most to the future are also those without explicit 
mythological content – that is, the events in these scenes can be explained in purely natural 
terms, even if the tone of the film is shot through and through with mythology. 
 Precisely because of this mythological tone, though, Kurosawa’s Dreams cannot be 
categorized as a purely secular apocalyptic film either. In the West, secular apocalypse is usually 
accompanied by nihilism, if the disaster is seen as inevitable, or humanism, if the disaster is 
overcome through human effort. Dreams avoids both of these patterns. Instead, Kurosawa 
chooses to overlay onto an ostensibly secular or humanist future a mythological or religious 
framework. Nuclear disaster, which can be portrayed purely materialistically in the West, is seen 
as a sacrilegious act through the lens of Japanese mythology. The solution, therefore, is not 
portrayed simply as a human endeavor, although certainly it requires a human response. Rather, 
Kurosawa’s final vision for the future is of a society which uses ritual and respect to create a 
sustainable way of life. This includes celebrating the cycles of life and death, honoring members 
of the community, and treating the natural world as an end in itself. As in the history of Shinto, 
the line between religion and secular ritual is very blurry indeed. 
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  Kurosawa’s use of mythology in Dreams represents a creative response to the real 
possibility of nuclear apocalypse. By presenting scientific materialist eschatology in the light of 
folklore, he illustrates and condemns the loss of value that has occurred in the modern world. His 
culminating counter-apocalyptic vision then provides a positive example of the sustainable, 
value-laden existence that Kurosawa hopes for human society. This vision is a direct challenge to 
the Western-made systems of capitalism and scientific materialism, and offers a specifically 
Eastern solution to their corresponding nihilism. Despite its relative lack of critical success as a 
film, Dreams offers a window into non-Western conceptions of eschatology. It reveals to 
Western viewers a possibility beyond the religious/secular dichotomy that has been an enduring 
assumption of our civilization. As Western scholars begin to realize that “religion” itself is a 
constructed category, Dreams can offer, in the medium of film, an alternative way of 
categorizing ideology, ritual and culture.  
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